Abstract. This paper presents xmx, a new symmetric block cipher optimized for public-key libraries and microcontrollers with arithmetic coprocessors. xmx has no S-boxes and uses only modular multiplications and xors. The complete scheme can be described by a couple of compact formulae that offer several interesting time-space trade-offs (number of rounds/key-size for constant security). In practice, xmx appears to be tiny and fast: 136 code bytes and a 121 kilo-bits/second throughput on a Siemens SLE44CR80s smart-card (5 MHz oscillator).
Introduction
Since efficiency and flexibility are probably the most appreciated design criteria, block ciphers were traditionally optimized for either software (typically SAFER [4] ) or hardware (DES [2] ) implementation. More recently, autonomous agents and object-oriented technologies motivated the design of particularly tiny codes (such as TEA [9] , 189 bytes on a 68HC05) and algorithms adapted to particular programming languages such as PERL.
Surprisingly, although an ever-increasing number of applications gain access to arithmetic co-processors [5] and public-key libraries such as BSAFE, MIR-ACL, BIGNUM [8] or ZEN [1] , no block cipher was specifically designed to take advantage of such facilities. This paper presents xmx (xor-multiply-xor), a new symmetric cipher which uses public-key-like operations as confusion and diffusion means. The scheme does not require S-boxes or permutation tables, there is virtually no key-schedule and the code itself (when relying on a co-processor or a library) is extremely compact and easy to describe.
xmx is firmware-suitable and, as such, was specifically designed to take a (carefully balanced) advantage of hardware and software resources.
The Algorithm

Basic operations
xmx is an iterated cipher, where a keyed primitive f is applied r times to an -bit cleartext m and a key k to produce a ciphertext c.
and n is an odd modulus.
Property: a • b is equivalent to a ⊕ b in most cases (when n ≤ 2 , and {a, b}
Property: For all a and b, a
f can therefore be used as a simply invertible building-block (a < n implies a • b < n) in iterated ciphers : Definition 2. Let n be an -bit odd modulus, m ∈ Z Z n and k be the key-array
The block-cipher xmx is defined by:
and:
Symmetry
A crucially practical feature of xmx is the symmetry of encryption and decryption. Using this property, xmx and xmx −1 can be computed by the same procedure:
Since the storage of k requires (2r + 1) bits, xmx schedules the encryption and decryption arrays k and k −1 from a single -bit key s:
For a couple of security reasons (explicited infra) s must be generated by the following procedure (where w(s) denotes the Hamming weight of s):
Although equally important, the choice of n is much less restrictive and can be conducted along three engineering criteria: prime moduli will greatly simplify key generation (gcd(b i , n) = 1 for all i), RSA moduli used by existing applications may appear attractive for memory management reasons and dense moduli will increase the probability Pr[a
As a general guideline, we recommend to keep n secret in all real-life applications but assume its knowledge for the sake of academic research.
3 Security xmx's security was evaluated by targeting a weaker scheme (wxmx) where • ∼ = ⊕ and k = (s, s, s, . . . , s, s, . . . , s, s, s).
Using the trick u ⊕ v = u + v − 2 (u ∧ v) for eliminating xors and defining:
we get by induction:
The number of rounds
When r = 1, the previous formulae become g 2 (x) = h 2 (x) ∧ s and
Assuming that w(δ) is low, we have (with a significantly high probability):
Therefore, selecting δ such that s ∧ δ = 0 ⇒ g 1 (x ⊕ δ) = g 1 (x), we get wxmx(k, x⊕δ)−wxmx(k, x) = (x⊕δ −x)·s−2 (s∧h 2 (x⊕δ)−s∧h 2 (x)) mod n . Plugging δ = 2 and an x such that x ∧ δ = 0 into this equation, we get:
Since h 2 (x) = s · x + s 2 − 2 g 1 (x) mod n (where g 1 (x) = x ∧ s), it follows that h 2 (x) and h 2 (x + 2) differ only by a few bits. Consequently, information about s leaks out and, in particular, long sequences of zeros or ones (with possibly the first and last bits altered) can be inferred from the difference wxmx(k, x ⊕ δ) − wxmx(k, x). In the more general setting (r > 1), we have
where e(x, δ, s) is a linear form with coefficients of the form α ∧ s − β ∧ s.
The difference will therefore leak again whenever:
Key-generation
The weight of s: Since g(x) is a polynomial which coefficients (b i ) are all bitwise smaller than s, the variety of g(x) is small when w(s) is small. In particular, when w(s) < wxmx(k, y) − wxmx(k, x) = (y − x) · s r mod n using the birthday paradox (the same g(x) should have been used twice). One can even obtain collisions on g with higher probability by simply choosing pairs of similar plaintexts. Using [7] (refined in [6] ), these attacks require almost no memory. Since a similar attack holds for s when w(s) is big (x ⊕ y = x + 2 (x ∧ y) − y), w(s) must be rather close to /2 and (1) implies that r must at least equal three to avoid the attack described in section 3.1.
The size of s: Chosen plaintext attacks on wxmx are also possible when s is too short: if s m < n after r iterations, s can be recovered by encrypting m = 0 since wxmx(k, 0 ) = b − 2 g(x) and g's coefficients are all bounded by s.
Observing that 0 ≤ wxmx(k, 0 ) − s r+1 ≤ s · 2 r , we have:
More generally, encrypting short messages with short keys may also reveal s. As an example, let = 256, r = 4, s = 0 176 |s and m = 0 176 |m where s and m are both 80-bit long. Since Pr[x ⊕ s = x + s] = (3/4) 80 ∼ = 2 −33 when s is 80-bit long, a gcd between ciphertexts will recover s faster than exhaustive search.
Register size
Since the complexity of section 3.1's attack must be at least 2 80 , we have:
and considering that w(s) ∼ = /2, the product r must be at least 320. r = 4 typically requires > 80 (brute force resistance implies > 80 anyway) but an inherent 2 /2 -complexity attack is still possible since wxmx is a (keyed) permutation over -bit numbers, which average cycle length is 2 /2 (given an iteration to the order 2 /2 of wxmx(k, x), one can find x with significant probability).
= 160 is enough to thwart these attacks.
Implementation
Standard implementations should use xmx with r = 8, = 512, n = 2 512 − 1 and A recent prototype on a Siemens SLE44CR80s results in a tiny (136 bytes) and performant code (121 kilo-bits/second throughput with a 5 MHz oscillator) and uses only a couple of 64-byte buffers.
The algorithm is patent-pending and readers interested in test-patterns or a copy of the patent application should contact the authors.
Further Research
As most block-ciphers xmx can be adapted, modified or improved in a variety of ways: the round output can be subjected to a constant permutation such as a circular rotation or the chunk permutation π(ABCD) → BADC where each chunk is 128-bit long (since π(π(x)) = x, xmx's symmetry will still be preserved). Other variants replace modular multiplications by point additions on an elliptic curve (ecxmx) or implement protections against [3] (taxmx).
It is also possible to define f on two -bit registers L and R such that:
where
and the inverse function is:
Since such designs modify only one register per round we recommend to increase r to at least twelve and keep generating s with xmx's original keygeneration procedure.
Challenge
It is a tradition in the cryptographic community to offer cash rewards for successful cryptanalysis. More than a simple motivation means, such rewards also express the designers' confidence in their own schemes. As an incentive to the analysis of the new scheme, we therefore offer (as a souvenir from FSE'97...) 256 Israeli Shkalim and 80 Agorot (n is the smallest 256-bit prime starting with 80 ones) to the first person who will degrade s's entropy by at least 56 bits in the instance: r = 8, = 256 and n = (2 80 − 1) · 2 176 + 157 but the authors are ready to carefully evaluate and learn from any feedback they get.
